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Abstract: There are two main objects of this paper. The first object is to 
compare the most important theories and opinions about competition, 
monopoly and antimonopoly policy. The second object is to summarize 
some monopoly regulation of these economics theories. All these theories 
are subdivided into five parts started from the oldest time, e. g. from 
Aristotle, through mercantilism, early capitalism, theories of A. Smith to the 
classical Ricardian theories. There is discussed the competition and the 
origin of the first framework of anti-trust legislation at the break of the 19
th
and 20
th centuries, the Karl Marx’s and his followers’ theories, the origin of 
imperfect competition and the system of neoliberal politics. 
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The main aim of this paper is to summarize and compare the attitudes towards 
imperfect competition, special towards monopoly and monopoly regulation of some 
economics theories. It stands to reason that the attitudes of several theories coherent 
with monopoly and antimonopoly policy were very different during the process of 
evolution. Above all the evolution of the last century was focused on the theory of 
dynamic competition. It was made out that monopoly is also limited by the process of 
making prices. These findings were the sources of new state regulations activities. It is 
the point, why to analyze the present situation of monopoly regulation and try to find a 
new arrangement which will make whole economics more competitive. 
1. Evolution of theories of competition, monopoly and antimonopoly policy 
The main aim of this chapter is to summarize and compare the attitudes towards 
imperfect competition, special towards monopoly and monopoly regulation of some 
economics theories. It stands to reason that the attitudes of several theories coherent 
with monopoly and antimonopoly policy were very different during the process of 
evolution. Above all the evolution of the last century was focused on the theory of 
dynamic competition. It was made out that monopoly is also limited by the process of 
making prices. These findings were the sources of new state regulations activities. It is 
the point, why to analyze the present situation of monopoly regulation and try to find a 
new arrangement which will make whole economics more competitive. 
1.1. The oldest theories of monopoly 
Adam Smith is writing about monopoly in his An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations like about an individual or a trading company. This 
company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by 99
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keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual 
demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their 
emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate. 
The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got. 
The natural price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is the lowest which 
can be taken, not upon every occasion, indeed, but for any considerable time together. 
The one is upon every occasion the highest which can be squeezed out of the buyers, or 
which, it is supposed, they will consent to give. The other is lowest which the sellers 
can commonly afford to take, and at the same time continue their business (Smith, A., 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1976, p. 78). 
In the accordance with was written above, wrote Smith that only state could 
stop the evolution of beginning monopoly. It helped to creative the origin of the first 
framework of anti-trust legislation. 
As Smith was averse to restrains on international trade, so also he was opposed 
to those on domestic commerce and with colonies. In an age when restrictive 
preferences, privileges and state grants of monopoly were commonplace, he opposed 
them all. He also opposed private combinations of producers and workers, although, in 
a characteristic aside, he noted that there were more laws against combinations by the 
sellers of labour than against the similar practice by the merchants and manufacturers 
who employed them. He was not, however, entirely optimistic as to the possibility of 
contending with private combination. The impulse to such association was strong. In 
another deathless passage he observes that people of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment a diversion ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in 
some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible, he says, to prevent such meetings, by 
any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. 
But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling 
together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render them 
necessary.  
A century later, what Smith thought impossible would, after a fashion, be 
attempted in the United States, and the effort would continue for another hundred years. 
The Sherman Act and later legislation would forbid those of the same trade, even when 
gathered for merriment and diversion, form discussing, much less agreeing upon, 
prices. The prohibition would encounter not a few of the difficulties tat smith foresaw.  
From Smith has come the commitment to competition as a principle in all 
capitalist societies – competition that is presumed to ensure optimal industrial 
performance. Considerably less influential has been Smith’s warning as to the 
institution that, along with the state it might destroy competition. This was the state 
chartered company – the corporation. Where it had monopoly privileges, as in the 
colonial era, he was especially critical. But he also thought little of its efficiency. He 
would be appalled at a world where, as in the United States, a thousand corporations 
dominate the industrial, commercial and financial landscape and are controlled by their 
hired management, something Smith thought especially to be deplored. He says, that 
being the managers’ father of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be 
expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartner frequently witch over their own (Galbraith, A History Of 
Economics, 1987, p. 70).  100
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1.2. First framework of antitrust law on the break of the 19th and 20th century 
On the break of the 19
th and 20
th century was necessary to start managing the 
regulation of the monopoly. The competition necessitated to its own destruction. The 
biggest companies tried to make the lowest prices as was possible and wonted to get 
exoteric market. So they tried to place another market with new products and services. 
Because of stronger and stronger competition these companies’ costs were pushed 
lower. The levels of these costs were lower than the demand enabled.  
It has been one of the principles of free-enterprise economic philosophies that 
monopolies are, as a general rule, undesirable and need to be strictly controlled. This is 
not to say that the advantages of monopolistic supply in certain specific areas have not 
been recognized; it is rather a case of ensuring that monopolies are restricted to these 
areas and, at the same time, taking the necessary steps to prevent them from exploiting 
the consumer. A case in point is the natural-gas industry. It is clear that a situation in 
which individual consumers could obtain their gas supply from competing companies, 
through competing pipelines and distribution systems, would be a highly wasteful form 
of competition. The idea of a single supplier, therefore, makes sense in economic terms. 
In order to prevent the consumer from being exploited, the monopoly's ability to control 
prices and supply needs to be restricted. This has generally been the view taken of firms 
operating as public utilities or in technical fields that invite a natural monopoly.  
The owners of monopoly fixed the prices of their commodity with exclusive 
reference to the immediate net revenue which they can derive from it. The increased use 
of their commodity will before long recoup them for their preset loss. So it is clear that 
is wanted of calculations by which monopolists should govern their actions, on the 
supposition that he regards an increase of consumers’ surplus as equally desirable to 
them. In case that the customer’s surplus is added to the monopoly revenue derived 
from it, the sum of the two is the money measure of the net benefits accruing from the 
sale of the commodity to producers and consumers together. And if the monopolist 
regards a gain to the consumers as of equal importance with an equal gain to himself, 
his aim will be to produce just that amount of the commodity which will make this total 
benefit a maximum. The amount which the monopolist will offer for sale will be greater 
and the price at which he will sell it will be less if he is to any extent desirous to 
promote the interests of consumers (Marshall, Principles of Economics, 1961, p. 402). 
These conditions conveyed to the origin of the first antitrust legislation. The first most 
famous law leaded to curb concentrations of power ant restrict trade and reduce 
economic competition were proposed by Sen. John Sherman.
Accordingly, most free-enterprise economic systems have an elaborate 
framework of laws and regulations aimed at controlling monopoly. The oldest and 
probably the most vigorous monopoly control legislation are represented in the U.S. 
antitrust laws. Consisting primarily of the 
http://search.eb.com/eb/topic?idxStructId=540115&typeId=13Sherman and 
http://search.eb.com/eb/topic?idxStructId=120766&typeId=13Clayton antitrust acts and 
the http://search.eb.com/eb/topic?idxStructId=101554&typeId=13Celler-Kefauver Act, 
they are aimed at preventing agreements among suppliers, the effect of which would be 
to limit competition, and at preventing mergers between and acquisitions by and of 
firms, the result of which would be to lessen competition or to create a monopoly. The 
legislation provides for stiff civil and criminal penalties, and most administrations have 
tended to enforce the laws vigorously. In areas where monopoly is countenanced, such 
as in public utilities, a considerable degree of public control is exercised to ensure that 101
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monopoly power is not abused. In Great Britain the basic aims of the anti-monopoly 
legislation are similar to those of the United States, but much greater weight is given to 
the concept of the public interest. In the United States, any agreement or act that limits 
competition is regarded as undesirable, but in Great Britain and other west European 
countries such acts are accepted if they can be demonstrated to be in, or not to be 
against, the public interest. In general terms, the degree of monopoly tends to be 
relatively small in the United States; it is considerably more pronounced in Britain, 
France, and other parts of Europe, where among operating monopolies are a large 
number of state-owned enterprises (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 
http://search.eb.com/eb/article?tocId=9067322).
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which declare illegal all attempts to 
monopolize any part of trade or commerce in the U.S. initially used against trade 
unions, it was more widely enforced under press. Theodore Roosevelt. In 1914 
Congress strengthened the act with the Clayton Antitrust Act and the formation of the 
Federal Trade Commission. In 1920 the U.S. Supreme Court relaxed antitrust 
regulations so that only “unreasonable” restraint of trade through acquisitions, mergers, 
and predatory pricing constituted a violation. For instance we can mention some others 
antitrust acts: The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 outlawed unfair price discrimination, 
interlocking directorates, and holding companies , as amended in 1936 by the 
Robinson-Patman Act, prohibits discrimination among customers through prices or 
other means; it also prohibits mergers or acquisitions whenever the effect may be to 
substantially lessen competition. A 1950 amendment to the Clayton act forbade a 
corporation to purchase another corporation's assets or stock, if doing so would reduce 
competition. Labour unions are also subject to antitrust laws (Encyclopedia Britannica 
Online, http://search.eb.com/ebc/article?tocId=9378482).
In the absence of competition, the supplier usually restricts output and increases 
price in order to maximize profits. The concept of pure monopoly is useful for 
theoretical discussion but is rarely encountered in actuality. In situations where having 
more than one supplier is inefficient (e.g., for electricity, gas, or water), economists 
refer to natural monopoly. For monopoly to exist there must be a barrier to the entry of 
competing firms. In the case of natural monopolies, the government creates that barrier. 
Either local government provides the service itself, or it awards a franchise to a private 
company and regulates it. In some cases the barrier is attributable to an effective patent.
In other cases the barrier that eliminates competing firms is technological. Large-scale, 
integrated operations that increase efficiency and reduce production costs confer a 
benefit on firms that adopt them and may confer a benefit on consumers if the lower 
costs lead to lower product prices. In many cases the barrier is a result of 
anticompetitive behavior on the part of the firm. Most free-enterprise economies have 
adopted laws to protect consumers from the abuse of monopoly power. The U.S. 
antitrust laws is the oldest examples of this type of monopoly-control legislation; 
public-utility law is an outgrowth of the English common law as it pertains to natural 
monopolies. Antitrust law prohibits mergers and acquisitions that lessen competition. 
The question asked is whether consumers will benefit from increased efficiency or be 
penalized with a lower output and a higher price. 
1.3 Karl Marx and his followers 
Marx was unaware of the existence of monopoly in the British economy of his 
day. He treated monopolies not as essential elements of capitalism but rather as 102
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remnants of the feudal and mercantilist past which had to be abstracted from in order to 
attain the clearest possible view of the basic structure and tendencies of capitalism. It is 
true that, unlike the classicists, Marx fully recognized the powerful trend toward the 
concentration and centralization of capital inherent in a competitive economy. His 
vision of the future of capitalism certainly included new and purely capitalist forms of 
monopoly. But he never attempted to investigate what would at the time have been a 
hypothetical system characterized by the prevalence of large-scale enterprise and 
monopoly.  
By accidental monopoly we mean a monopoly which a buyer or seller acquires 
through an accidental state of supply and demand. The assumption that the commodities 
of the various spheres of production are sold at their value merely implies, of course, 
that their value is the centre of gravity around which their prices fluctuate, and their 
continual rises and drops tend to equalize. There is also the market value—of which 
later—to be distinguished from the individual value of particular commodities produced 
by different producers. The individual value of some of these commodities will be 
below their market-value (that is, less labour-time is required for their production than 
expressed in the market-value) while that of others will exceed the market-value. On 
the one hand, market-value is to be viewed as the average value of commodities 
produced in a single sphere, and, on the other, as the individual value of the 
commodities produced under average conditions of their respective sphere and forming 
the bulk of the products of that sphere. It is only in extraordinary combinations that 
commodities produced under the worst, or the most favorable, conditions regulate the 
market-value, which, in turn, forms the centre of fluctuation for market-prices. The 
latter, however, are the same for commodities of the same kind. If the ordinary demand 
is satisfied by the supply of commodities of average value hence of a value midway 
between the two extremes, then the commodities whose individual value is below the 
market-value realize an extra surplus-value, or surplus-profit, while those, whose 
individual value exceeds the market-value, are unable to realize a portion of the 
surplus-value contained in them (Marx, K., Capital Vol III., London, UK: ElecBook, 
2001, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/oulu/Doc?id=2001686&page=235). It does no good to 
say that the sale of commodities produced under the least favorable conditions proves 
that they are required to satisfy the demand. If in the assumed case the price were 
higher than the average market-value, the demand would be smaller. 
Finally, if equalization of surplus-value into average profit meets with obstacles 
in the various spheres of production in the form of artificial or natural monopolies, and 
particularly monopoly in landed property, so that a monopoly price becomes possible, 
which rises above the price of production and above the value of the commodities 
affected by such a monopoly, then the limits imposed by the value of the commodities 
would not thereby be removed. The monopoly price of certain commodities would 
merely transfer a portion of the profit of the other commodity-producers to the 
commodities having the monopoly price. A local disturbance in the distribution of the 
surplus-value among the various spheres of production would indirectly take place, but 
it would leave the limit of this surplus-value itself unaltered. Should the commodity 
having the monopoly price enter into the necessary consumption of the labourer, it 
would increase the wage and thereby reduce the surplus-value, assuming the labourer 
receives the value of his labour-power as before. It could depress wages below the 
value of labour-power, but only to the extent that the former exceed the limit of their 
physical minimum. In this case the monopoly price would be paid by a deduction from 103
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real wages (i. e. the quantity of use-values received by the labourer for the same 
quantity of labour) and from the profit of the other capitalists. The limits within which 
the monopoly price would affect the normal regulation of the prices of commodities 
would be firmly fixed and accurately calculable. (Marx, K., Capital Vol III., London, 
UK: ElecBook, 2001, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/oulu/Doc?id=2001686&page=1153).
Engels, in some of his own writings after Marx’s death commented on the rapid 
growth of monopolies during the 1880s and 1890s, but he did not try to incorporate 
monopoly into the body of Marxian economic theory. The wholesale merchant, Engel, 
says quite correctly, that efforts of the syndicate are intended to create a monopoly for 
itself and to eliminate the wholesale trade entirely. Naturally prices will not be any 
lower for the retailer. If the motives were not to obtain for the factory and the syndicate 
the same benefits which accrue to the wholesale merchant, the whole movement would 
be without purpose (Hilferding, R., Finance Capital, London, 1981, p. 416). 
The first who incorporate monopoly into the body of Marxian economic theory 
was Rudolf Hilferding in his important work, Das Finanzkapital, published in 1910. But 
for all his emphasis on monopoly, Hilferding did not treat it as a qualitatively new 
element in the capitalist economy; rather he saw it as effecting essentially quantitative 
modifications of the basic Marxian laws of capitalism. We must recognize that 
competition, which was the predominated form of market relations in nineteenth-
century Britain, has ceased to occupy that position, not only in Britain but everywhere 
else in the capitalist world (Baran A. P., Sweezy, M., Monopoly Capital, Suffolk, 1966, 
p. 416). 
Rudolf Hilferding writes about protective tariff, which means a constriction of 
the economic territory, and hence an interference with the development of the 
productive forces, since it reduces the size of industrial plants, discourages 
specialization, and impedes, finally, that international division of labour which brings 
about a flow of capital into those branches of production for which a given country is 
best suited. This is all the more important in the case of the modern high protective 
tariff since the tariff rates are frequently fixed less of regard for the technical conditions 
of production which prevail in particular branches of production, than as the outcome of 
a political struggle for power among various industrial groups whose influence upon he 
state ultimately determines the tariff structure. The tariff is a brake upon the 
development of the productive forces and hence of industry. It means direct deprives 
industries which are capable of being cartelized of their monopoly of the domestic 
market, if that monopoly is not already assured by protected freight rates in the case of 
coal or by a natural monopoly in the case of German potash production (Hilferding, R., 
Finance Capital, London, 1981, p. 312). 
1.4 Neoclassicism 
In the market for consumer’s goods a relatively small number of sellers face a 
large number of buyers, so that the imperfection of competition tells in favor of the 
sellers. In the labour market the position is reversed. Thus the share of labour in total 
output is ground between the upper and the nether millstones of monopoly and 
monopsony. This account of the matter bears a close resemblance to the theory of 
Lexis, quoted by Engels in the preface to Volume III of Capital. He writes that the 
capitalist sellers, such as the producer of raw materials, the manufacturer, the wholesale 
dealer, the retail dealer, all make a profit on their transactions, each selling his product 
at a higher price than the purchase price, each adding a certain percentage to the price 104
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paid by him. The labourer alone is unable to raise the price of his commodity, he is 
compelled, by is oppressed condition, to sell his labour to the capitalist at a price 
corresponding to its cost of production, that is to say, or the means of his subsistence. 
Further he writes therefore that capitalist additions to the prices strike the labourer with 
full force and result in a transfer of a part of the value of the total produce to the 
capitalist class. Engels gives (though grudgingly) his approval to this formulation which 
amounts to the same thing as the Marxian theory of surplus-value. Lexis thus provides a 
bridge between Marx and the later theory. For Marx’s scheme under-capacity working 
is impossible and the limit to the output of any concern is set, not by the imperfection of 
the market, but by the capacity of capital. The post dated theories exposed many 
relatively minor defects in capitalism which Marx, concentrating on major issues, was 
content to ignore. 
The theory is good enough for purposes of a general discussion of the nature of 
the system. Where outright monopoly rules, or where a group of commodities is 
produced by a few powerful firms, there is great scope for individual variations in 
policy, and it is hard to make any generalization at all as to what governs the margin of 
profit per unit of output. 
  All this makes a serious breach in the smooth surface of the orthodox 
theory of value, and it seems that economic science has not yet solved its first problem 
– what determines the price of a commodity? 
In this first statement of the theory of value Marshall wrote, that the great 
central law o economic science is that producers, each governed under the sway of free 
competition by calculations of his own interest, will endeavor so to regulate the amount 
of any commodity which is produced for a given market, during a given period, that this 
amount shall be just capable on the average of finding purchasers at a remunerative 
price, a remunerative price being defined so as to allow for normal profits on capital. 
This statement may be taken to mean two quite different things. It may mean that each 
producer, governed by calculations of his own interest, endeavors to maximize the 
profit, at each moment, on his current rate of output, by balancing marginal cost against 
margin gain.  
The other interpretation is that each producer endeavors to fix, not the price 
which maximizes his current profit, but the price which will be remunerative in the long 
run. This at first sight seems plausible, but it entirely begs the question of normal profits 
on which, as we have seen, academic economics fails to provide any theory which is 
relevant to the real world. Moreover, even if the question of normal profits were settled, 
it would still remain to inquire what level of utilization of equipment is normal in the 
long run. Generally speaking, the lower the level of utilization, good years with bad, 
and the higher gross margin required to bring in any given level of profits. But the 
higher the gross margin, other things equal, the lower the level of utilization, for given 
the expected fluctuations in demand, the amount of capital seeking employment in the 
industry is governed by the gross margin established in the market. And the amount of 
capital employed influences the average utilization per unit of capital. The three 
determinants, profit per unit of output, profit per unit of capital, and capital per unit of 
output, ale all interdependent, and the whole analysis dissolves in a haze of doubt. 
The Marxian theory might yield the explanation that the development of trade-
union power has been just sufficiently rapid to prevent the rate of exploitation from 
rising with the productivity of labour, while the academic theory suggests that a secular 
rise in monopoly has been just offset by a relative fall in raw-materials prices. Both 105
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explanations are somewhat lame, and the mystery of the constant relative shares 
remains as a reproach to theoretical economics (Robinson, J., An essay on Marxian 
economics, New York, 1967, p. 81). 
1.5 Ordoliberalism and dynamic theory of competition 
The determination of the value of the monopoly is a special problem, and in 
solving it we must not forget that in the normal circular flow no motive to form such a 
value exists, hence the gain is not to be related to any other magnitude. However all this 
may be, the monopolist can at any rate never say that they make no profit because they 
ascribe an extremely high value to their monopoly. 
In a discussing Lauderdale’s theory of interest Böm-Bawerk also comments 
upon the case in which a labor-saving and hence profit-yielding machine is 
monopolized. He emphasizes rightly that this machine will be so dear that no profit, or 
only the minimum which will just induce people to purchase or hire it, will be 
connected with its employment. Yet a profit is undoubtedly connected with its 
production, which is as permanent as the patent. It might be said that the monopoly 
position is for the monopolist something analogous to a productive factor. Imputation 
takes place with reference to the services of this quasi-factor of production just as with 
reference to other factors. The machine as such is not a source of surplus value, nor is 
its means of production, but the monopoly makes it possible to obtain a surplus value 
with the machine or its means of production. Obviously nothing is changed if we allow 
producer and user to coincide in one person. There would be a source of surplus value 
the existence of which would be explained by the theory of monopoly; there would also 
be a reason for the assignment of a return to monopolists; and finally the fact that 
neither imputation nor competition annihilates the return would be explained. However, 
such monopoly positions do not occur regularly and numerously enough for this 
explanation to be accepted, and moreover interest exists without them. 
There are several designs for escaping market discipline, including that 
imposed by younger, more adaptable, more aggressive competitors. The first is a return 
to tariff protection. Faced with foreign competition, the great industrial corporation 
seeks tariffs and also quotas that will release it from the pressure of market constraints. 
After ceremonial praise of the free market, the need for a worthy exception is urged. A 
revival of protectionist sentiment and legislation in the older industrial countries having 
already occurred in the present, it will do so to even greater degree in the future. Once 
protective tariffs were for infant industries, now they are for the old and putatively 
senile.
A second well-established design for dealing with competition is simply to take 
it over. This is the purpose of the international or multinational corporation. It has long 
been thought that the latter is an instrument of aggression, even imperialism, on the 
world stage. Far more important is its protective purpose, its profoundly important 
service as an escape from the constraints of the market. 
Evading market discipline is increasingly apparent in a third design, this is for 
the older bureaucratically and intellectually more rigid enterprise to assign to firms in 
the newer industrial lands work that can no longer be performed competitively in the 
older countries.  
Another and final recourse available to aging and inefficient private enterprises 
is to seek forthright intervention by the government. This, in practice, goes far beyond 
protection from foreign competition. In the United States the Reagan administration has 106
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repeatedly set aside its free market rhetoric to come to the fescue of failing banks and 
needful exporters and, at unprecedented costs, to protect farmers from the free market. 
Again there is first the speech on the eternal verities of tree enterprise and then the case 
for the particular exception (Galbraith, J., K., A History Of Economics, London, 1987, 
p. 294). 
We conclude that sunk costs, unlike fixed costs; can constitute a barrier to 
entry. In particular, we argue now that fixed costs need not have any detrimental 
welfare consequences, unless they also happen to be sunk. In an industry whose firms 
use only capital on wheels or winks, some or all of that capital may be fixed, bud it is 
not sunk. This means that in the absence of other entry barriers, natural or artificial, an 
incumbent, even if he can threaten retaliation after entry, dare not offer profit-making 
opportunities to potential entrants because an entering firm can hit and run, gathering in 
the available profits and departing when the going gets rough. Such a situation fits our 
definition of a contestable market, that is, a market vulnerable to costless reversible 
entry, even when it is currently occupied by an oligopoly or a monopoly. The 
contestable market is a generalization of the case of pure competition, and it offers 
many of the same benefits. Even if it is run by a monopoly, a contestable market will 
yield only zero profits and offer inducements for the adoption of Ramsey-optimal 
prices; an addition, it will enforce efficiency of production, the adoption of new 
improved techniques as they become available, and avoidance of cross subsidy in 
pricing . 
This resolves the apparent contradiction between our conclusion that fixed 
costs of sufficient magnitude permit the incumbent to adopt entry preventing prices and 
the preceding assertion that, in themselves, they constitute no barrier to entry. The 
availability of sustainable prices does permit the incumbent to preclude entry. But he 
can do so only by offering the public the very same benefits that actual competition 
would otherwise have brought with it. With entry barriers, supernormal profits, 
inefficiencies, cross subsidies, and no optimal prices all become possible. But in a 
contestable market, which is perfectly consistent with the presence of fixed costs that 
are not sunk, matters change drastically, and government intervention can contribute far 
less, if anything, to the general welfare (Galbraith, J., K., A History Of Economics, 
London, 1987, p. 292). 
2. The Method Corporate Social Responsibility 
In a large number of scientific literatures is written that method CSR has three 
basic areas of field of actions. It is economic, social and environmental area. For the 
thesis occasions we will abstract from the environmental area and will focus on the 
economic and social aspects. It is necessary to be aware of the fact, that monopoly are 
not scathe full for economic and for society. The existing of monopoly is a natural 
result of competition. So it should be useful to find the way how to cooperate with 
monopolies without negative impact on the society and economics. The second goal of 
this thesis is to describe the way how to minimize the number of regulation activities 
from the government in Czech Republic.  
2.1. The Method CSR 
Why should companies care about their social and economics responsibilities? 
There are a few aspects why to use CSR by managing corporate. The moral ones tend to 107
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be quite clear, while the financial ones are still more difficult to measure. They are 
usually referred to as the business case for CSR. 
The business case for CSR argues that a responsible attitude toward society and 
the environment can make a business more competitive, more resilient to shocks, and 
more likely to attract and hold both consumers and the best employees. 
In a world where socially responsible investment is growing, it can also attract 
investment and save businesses money in dealing with regulators, banks and insurers. 
Some companies also feel that CSR is a significant part of their risk 
management and reputation strategy. In a world where brand value and reputation are 
increasingly seen as a company's most valuable assets, CSR can build the loyalty and 
trust that ensure a bright sustainable future. 
The method CSR is good not only for society but also for a doing good 
business. Better understanding of the potential benefits of CSR for the competitiveness 
of individual companies and for national economies can help encourage the spread of 
CSR practice. The Department for Trade and Industry and some other departments have 
therefore supported work exploring the business case for CSR. These cases will be 
mentioned in the last chapter of the doctoral thesis after thoroughgoing tuition with 
experts.
Business principles convey the basic reasons for a company’s existence as well 
as how it carries out its role. They link a business’s core purpose and values to its 
operations by providing guidance on decision-making processes, strategic goal setting 
and behaviors. Business principles serve as a central and always-present frame of 
reference for organizational decisions.
Business principles may be articulated using any combination of statements and 
may include among others: mission, vision, and values statements, codes of conduct, 
business principle statements, etc. Regardless of what they are called or how an 
individual company groups their business principles together, it is through such 
statements that many companies have chosen to demonstrate their commitment to the 
larger notion of corporate social responsibility. Such statements extend a company’s 
responsibility beyond return to shareholders to include an acknowledgement of its 
responsibilities to a broad range of stakeholders throughout society including 
employees, customers, business partners, communities and the environment (BSR Staff: 
Business Principles, Business for Social Responsibility, 
http://www.bsr.org/CSRResources/IssueBriefDetail.cfm?DocumentID=48977).
2.2. Business importance  
As with any company-wide action, the articulation of business principles 
should be grounded in a clear understanding of how they provide short and long term 
value to the company in both externally and internally focused ways. Here are some of 
the benefits that companies experience from having clearly articulated business 
principles:
Organizational Touchstone: Companies are now increasingly attempting to 
establish a set of holistic, explicit statements that reflect an interlinked set of values and 
commitments. This shift towards a world-view that recognizes the interrelated nature of 
stakeholder issues can provide a central comprehensive reference point for company-
wide strategy as well as broader acknowledgement and consideration of stakeholder 
expectations. Employees attached to different functional aspects of an operation may 
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principles. This common set of beliefs can in turn contribute to a sense of cultural 
cohesion and social solidarity in a company otherwise characterized by a decentralized 
structure with thousands of employees dispersed across the globe.  
Values-based Decision-Making: Companies that institutionalize a values-based 
decision-making process can proactively address a broad range of legal and ethical 
dilemmas. Clearly defined values, when integrated into a company's organizational 
infrastructure, provide employees with the necessary tools and conceptual framework to 
make independent decisions in their daily operations that are consistent with the 
company's underlying values. As a result, these companies reduce their vulnerability to 
misconduct and the damage this can do to management focus, profitability, brand 
image, and overall reputation. It cannot be overstated, however, that business principles 
will only serve this function when successfully communicated to all employees and 
integrated into decision-making infrastructures. Only then can they be used successfully 
as a vital tool to guide decision-making at all levels of the company - from the 
executive office to the shop floor - and throughout a company’s supply chain.  
Greater Employee Commitment and Motivation: A stated and demonstrated 
organizational commitment to responsible values and principles can help employees 
find meaning and purpose in their work and help them link their individual efforts to 
those of the company as a whole. Studies show that this perception of shared values and 
purpose at all levels of the company contributes to organizational performance by 
inspiring feelings of commitment, contributing to increased retention, as well as helping 
to attract prospective employees.  
Findings from additional research conducted by BSR (Business for social 
responsibility) underscore that employees have more positive feelings about their work 
and themselves - and as such demonstrate a stronger commitment to their workplace - 
when they believe that the company they work for demonstrates good values and ethical 
practices. In contrast, other evidence points to a possible crisis of confidence within the 
workforce.
Point of Reference for External Stakeholders: When a company articulates its 
business principles, it enables stakeholders to know exactly where it stands on relevant 
issues, thereby taking the first crucial step in aligning internal operations and external 
expectations. This sharing of information regarding a company’s values and positions 
can benefit its relationship with several different stakeholder groups:  
Enhanced Customer Loyalty: Increasingly, customers are factoring companies' 
business practices and perceived values into purchasing decisions. Several companies 
that are typically associated with values-based business practices in the media and by 
consumers credit their commercial success, in large part, to brand loyalty among 
customers who support the company's values and mission. Indeed, mounting evidence 
points to a belief on the part of consumers that companies have a significant 
responsibility to society that extends beyond the simple delivery of affordable products 
or services. A 2002 survey in 25 countries by Environics International found that more 
than one third of surveyed consumers believed that large companies “should do more 
than give money to solve problems.” The same study found that almost 50 percent of 
consumers had considered punishing a company based on its social actions, and that 
nearly 30 percent had actually avoided a company for that reason. Further, public 
relations firm Quentin Bell Organization asserts that two in three U.K. consumers have 
boycotted at least one brand for “perceived unethical behavior.” 95 percent of those 
consumers say they’ll never purchase those brands again, while 10 percent follow up by 109
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writing letters and signing petitions (CSR facts and figures, CSR Europe Organization, 
http://www.csreurope.org/aboutus/CSRfactsandfigures_page397.aspx).
Supplier Alignment and Loyalty: Businesses with global supply chains are 
experiencing increased stakeholder pressure to take greater responsibilities for the 
activities of their suppliers and other business partners. Business principles may serve 
as a useful tool through which a company can communicate its expectations to suppliers 
regarding their conduct. It is becoming increasingly common for companies to require 
suppliers through contract language to agree to operate according to a set of social and 
environmental-related criteria or face the possible termination of the relationship.
Starting Point for Dialogue with Public Interest/Activist Groups: The public 
release of business principles often represents the starting point from which a dialogue 
between companies and organizations concerned with their operations begins. It is 
particularly important that such language is backed up by recognizable performance 
related to the business principles. Companies must “walk their talk” (or be prepared to), 
or potentially face damaging consequences such as negative publicity and impact to 
their credibility. A company’s decision to publicize its business principles, however, 
can help it lay the foundation for a public-private relationship based on trust.  
2.3 Another impacts of using CSR 
CSR can also help to reduced absenteeism and save companies money through 
increased productivity and by a reduction in hiring and training costs. For example, 
companies that improve working conditions and labour practices among their offshore 
suppliers often experience a decrease in defective or unsellable merchandise. 
Using the CSR as part of a corporate business strategy can result in high 
efficiency in operations, for instance, improved efficiency in the use of energy and 
natural resources; reduced waste such as reducing emissions of gases; and selling 
recycling materials. 
3. Application of The Method Corporate SOCIAL Responsibility 
On the basis of above described method, it is gone to be elaborated the 
dissertation thesis on the topic ‚Theory of antitrust regulation - application on The 
Czech Republic‘. The solitary approach of CSR is very wide and that is why the 
attention is going to be paid only to the analysis of the cost elements in the monopoly 
area of the Czech Republic. The aim of any economically advanced country is not the 
effort to eject the monopoly from the market. The perception of the monopoly existence 
as something bad or absolutely ineligible is wrong. We have to realize that the 
monopoly is one of the basic market structures which are not itself economically or 
socially harmful. It depends on the internal or external elements - control apparatus and 
control precautions in order that there would be never reached the misuse of privilege 
of the company position on the market. On this basis is going to be analyzed the social 
capacity of existence of the selected monopoly, it is going to be discovered its extent of 
its dominance in the market and the level of the social capacity. For this purpose is 
going to be made the analysis of government control precautions and its following 
description. The supposed aim is to find the precautions which were more successful in 
the past. Thanks to detailed study of particular control standards will be possible to 
appoint which precautions were less efficient and which were even useless. In the last 
seventeen years were made a lot of these precautions. The other problem which relates 
to the monopoly existence is ‚exploitation of small and middle companies which co - 110
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operate with the monopoly. In some cases we cannot discuss this fact and it is going to 
be very difficult to prove it and try to eliminate it. This is the fact when the small and 
middle companies are for example the sub-suppliers of the monopoly and compared to 
monopoly they carry out the minimum or almost zero profit. This situation comes when 
the monopoly strictly dictates the trading conditions and the sub-supplier is forced to 
accept them because of his position in the market. In case the sub-supplier does not 
accept the trade conditions it means the loss of demand for the sub-supplier. I would 
like to propose this subparagraph as a subject of the discussion and I would be very 
pleased if there are any factual suggestions how to work with this problem and how to 
solve it. 
The increasing number of European enterprises develops own strategies of 
shared social responsibility as a reaction to whole range   of social, economic and 
environmental oppressions. Their aim is to send the signal to different stakeholders 
whereby they have to face: employers, share holders, investors, consumers, public 
administration and non government organizations. 
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